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Identifying the Presence of Known Vulnerabilities in the Versions of a
Software Project
by Craig Cabrey
As the world continues to embrace a completely digital society in all aspects
of life, the ever present threat of a security flaw in a software system looms.
Especially with a stream of high profile security flaws and breaches, the public
is more aware of the risk now than ever before.
However, the realities of any software project is that there are engineering
concerns of the utmost importance that all demand simultaneous attention.
To balance and manage these challenges, software engineering has developed
patterns of industry activities and best practices. Yet even as engineers rely
on these practices to stay afloat, managing security can become elusive in a
tangled mess of complex relationships between systems. Modern software
projects rely upon other software to do its job; only the most niche and spe-
cialized software lives in isolation in today’s industry.
In this work, we present an approach to help alleviate one of the aspects of ac-
tively managing security in a software project. The objectives of this approach
are 1. to establish the presence of a known vulnerability in a software project
version and 2. to develop a set of versions of a software project which identify
vulnerability status. We tested the approach on three Apache Software Foun-
dation projects, for a total of eleven vulnerabilities tested. In the analysis of
iv
the results, we find that the approach is conservative in marking a particular
version not vulnerable, but when it does so, it is completely consistent with
the evaluation results. This conservative nature is a beneficial characteristic
of the approach when considering the context of software security in which it
operates.
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Introduction
1.1 Background
Over time, software projects evolve to be enormously complex, both in terms
of structure and interactions with external systems. There are a number of con-
cerns of which engineers must be aware during the system’s design phase and
its evolution. Issues such as compatibility, deployment, quality control, and
security all demand time and resources while a project is being developed or
maintained. Modern practices to address these concerns can be traced all the
way back to when Belady et. al proposed Lehman’s Law of Software Evolu-
tion (Belady and Lehman, 1976).
Among those mentioned, software security has become an issue of paramount
importance. With the global transition to online systems, the smallest mis-
take could have far reaching consequences (Anderson, 2001; Telang and Wat-
tal, 2007). Software security, then, is a fundamental quality of any system. To
address this, industry standardized practices have been developed surround-
ing security issues, such as responsible disclosure1. Responsible disclosure re-
quires the cooperation of all involved parties, from the software maintainers to
the software users. Without this cooperation, the practice falls apart and has
the potential to leave software open for exploit.
1http://www.cert.org/vulnerability-analysis/vul-disclosure.cfm
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Within the software community, a flaw that has security ramifications is known
as a vulnerability. A vulnerability is a software defect that exposes an attack
vector for a malicious actor to exploit. Not every vulnerability within a system
is necessarily exploitable, however it can be difficult to understand when this
is the case (Shirey, 2000).
The discovery and disclosure of new vulnerabilities occurs on a regular basis
and is an area of research that is fairly well understood. For example, Liu et.
al (Liu et al., 2012) performed a survey on techniques of discovering vulnerabil-
ities and outlined a number of techniques: static analysis, penetration testing,
fuzzing, Vulnerability Discovery Models, and more. These techniques are al-
ready deployed in practice while research on new and existing techniques is
continuing.
However, while much research has been done in the way of predicting vul-
nerabilities (Hovsepyan et al., 2012; Shin and Williams, 2013), there is little
research on tracking existing vulnerabilities across the history of a software
project. In an industry that is increasingly collaborative and decentralized (es-
pecially in the case of open source projects), the possibility of regressions being
introduced remains ever present. At least two of Lehman’s laws reinforce this
possibility: increasing complexity and declining quality. Furthermore, the ever
increasing trend of code reuse across and within projects makes possible the
contamination of security problems from external pieces of software.
Utilizing the vast quantity of information on security vulnerabilities and high
quality project metadata, known vulnerabilities can be tracked throughout a
project’s history. Projects that have a history of past vulnerabilities will be able
to track the status of these defects moving forward, to the benefit of all involved
parties.
The goal of this research is twofold: 1. develop a general algorithmic approach
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for identifying the presence (or absence) of a known vulnerability in a soft-
ware project, and 2. from this algorithm, extrapolate the set of versions of the
software project that contain the vulnerability and those that do not.
Section 1.2 outlines the motivation for this work and Section 1.3 details the spe-
cific research objectives. In Section 2, the related work is identified. Section 3
gives an in-depth overview of the approach. Section 4 presents the results,
evaluation, and analysis. Sections 4.5, 5.1, and 5.2 outline threats to validity,
applications, and future work, respectively. Finally, Section 5 recaps with the
conclusion.
1.2 Motivation
Since the exposure of high profile security vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed (Du-
rumeric et al., 2014) and POODLE (Möller, Duong, and Kotowicz, 2014), secu-
rity has become a forefront issue not only in the software engineering industry,
but also on the minds of the general public.
As the number of high profile security vulnerabilities continues to grow, the
question has been raised as to whether security is being managed as properly
as it could be. The proliferation of advanced mobile computing platforms has
placed an additional emphasis on this urgency, as secure systems are more
critical now than ever before.
At the same time, software engineering techniques have advanced significantly
since the introduction of Lehman’s Laws. Developers have turned to the vast
ecosystem of open source software to provide functionality built by the com-
munity that proved too difficult or too cumbersome to achieve on an individual
basis. But this approach also has its downsides.
The quality of external code has a significant influence on the quality of the
project. For example, Mojica et. al analyzed hundreds of thousands of Android
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applications in search of code reuse (Mojica et al., 2014). The authors found that
the quality of the apps and libraries that were being reused affected the quality
of the consuming app. In the same respect, security has an impact as well:
including vulnerable versions of an app or library might infect the user.
In addition to this, dependency management becomes another item on the
maintenance checklist, further increasing the mental load of the maintainers (Klatt
et al., 2012). For the projects that have the necessary infrastructure to perform
these tasks, it is less of an issue. But for projects that don’t have the resources or
tooling necessary, dependencies may stagnate. In many cases, developers will
simply bypass the proper channels and directly include copies of the libraries
which they wish to use. This leads to a situation where there are many copies
of the same software included as a dependency in such a way that precludes
easily updating the software.
Keeping apprised on the latest developments in the security landscape and
software engineering practices is a difficult challenge. Millions of projects are
engaging in software reuse in an unprecedented manner. The downside is that
keeping these projects up to date, especially as vulnerabilities are disclosed,
patched, and released, can be a daunting challenge. This research attempts to
alleviate part of that burden by introducing a method to automatically track
the status of a vulnerability across different versions of a software project.
1.3 Research Objectives
There are two objectives that this work contributes. The first objective is to de-
velop a general algorithmic approach to identifying the presence of a known
vulnerability in a software project. The second is to determine the set of ver-
sions of the software project that contain the resolution of the vulnerability and
the set of versions which do not.
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The end result of the research is to present the versions of a given software
project that resolve a given vulnerability. This is intended to be used by a soft-
ware developer to track when a system dependency may be exposing a vulner-
ability in the system and a path forward to resolve the potential vulnerability.
1.3.1 Vulnerability Identification
The goal of this part of the research is to devise a methodology by which to
identify whether the given software version exhibits a given vulnerability. It is
important to note that the purpose of this research is not to identify additional,
unknown vulnerabilities.
1.3.2 Software Version Sets
The result of this part of the research is to utilize the methodology of identify-
ing whether a software version exhibits a particular vulnerability discussed in
the previous section and apply it to all versions of a software project.
It is important to note here that just because some version of software contains
the resolution for a vulnerability, it does not preclude future versions from hav-
ing the same vulnerability present again. There are many factors that go into
software development that may cause a vulnerability to reappear, such as a
significant refactoring. Therefore, it is important to consider all versions of a
software project and not simply stop at the version of the software that initially
incorporated the defect resolution.
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Related Work
There are two general areas of research that are relevant to this work.
The first is security research. Security is a complex and ever evolving topic
which is unique in that it includes the presence of bad actors. In regards to
security, the software engineering industry has grown tremendously in its un-
derstanding of and ability to proactively seek out the best practices in software
security.
The second is software evolution over a time period. While this is a particularly
large field, we are interested in observing the activity of code over time in how
it is modified, used, and re-used. This is a heavily researched area of software
engineering and there are a variety of techniques and practices developed over
the past several decades.
2.1 Change Detection
Fluri et. al presented an approach, change distilling, that is capable of tracking
changes across software versions (Fluri et al., 2007). Rather than relying on text
difference algorithms, the approach uses abstract syntax trees and tree-based
differencing algorithms. The authors evaluated the algorithm with a bench-
mark of 1,064 manually classified changes from three open source projects.
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Kim and Notkin surveyed matching techniques for revisions across a software
project (M. Kim and Notkin, 2006). The evaluated matching techniques were:
1. Entity Name,
2. String,
3. Syntax Tree,
4. Control Flow Graph,
5. Program Dependence Graph,
6. Binary Graph,
7. Clone Detection, and
8. Origin Analysis
The authors found that the optimal matching technique varies on the specific
context. However, the best technique involved a combinations of techniques.
This hybrid approach consists of running all techniques and finding a consen-
sus from the results.
For the purposes of this research, we will be focusing on the second technique,
matching by string. While this technique is not the best in terms of its ability to
accurately match across different revisions of a project, it is the best option for
the context of our work.
Techniques such as Entity Name, Control Flow Graph, and Program Depen-
dence graph are too coarse in their approach. The core cause of a vulnerability
can manifest itself in the smallest of details (for example, an off by one error
that causes a buffer overflow). Thus, these approachs are unable to provide the
fine grain detail this research requires. The Syntax Tree technique requires spe-
cialized tooling to be able to parse the source artifacts and build up the abstract
syntax trees for comparison purposes. Since one of the goals of the work is to
be a general algorithmic approach, depending on support of specific languages
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is not acceptable. Binary matching would require transforming the patch into
its binary equivalent, which would be even more inaccurate (differences in bi-
naries of different platforms, lack of reproducible builds, and so on). Finally,
the clone detection and origin analysis techniques are promising approachs,
but unfortunately neither one would be accept a snippet of code as an input,
such as what a patch would provide.
2.2 Vulnerability Discovery
In another work, Kim explored different vulnerability discovery models and
presented another that takes advantage of multiple versions within a software
project (J. Kim, Malaiya, and Ray, 2007). The proposed model analyzes two
successive versions. Kim finds that two successful versions are likely to share
vulnerabilities because of the shared codebase.
Spacco et. al utilized a static analysis tool, FindBugs, to track defect warnings
across different versions of a software project (Spacco, Hovemeyer, and Pugh,
2006). The authors identify two approaches: pairing warnings from differ-
ent versions and warning signatures. The former identifies the pair based on
a hash and equivalence predicate. The latter generates a string that includes
class, method, and field names, then compares the value of the MD5 hash of
the string.
Zhang et. al performed an empirical study with the National Vulnerability
Database in an attempt to predict software vulnerabilities (Zhang, Caragea,
and Ou, 2011). Though the prediction model failed to produce satisfactory
results, part of the author’s approach includes using the difference between
two versions of a software project as an input.
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2.3 Code Reuse
Hanna et. al (Hanna et al., 2013) built and executed a scalable system that
performed code similarity analysis on applications from the Google Play Store
called Juxtapp. The researchers evaluated their system on a sample of 58,000
Android applications to demonstrate the system’s scalability. They found 463
applications with buggy code reuse, 34 applications with known malware, and
applications that are pirated versions of legitimate applications available on
the store.
Adams et. al conducted an empirical study regarding the various activities
required to make code reuse effective. (Adams et al., 2016). The process of
code reuse is not free: it requires specific quality assurance and other software
engineering activities which can cost signficant time and effort. The empiri-
cal study analyizes three highly successful open source distributions (Debian,
Ubuntu, and FreeBSD). One of the more relevant aspects of this study was how
these organizations go about including updates from upstream vendors. There
was no clear answer to this question: changing anything is an inherent risk,
but not including critical updates (such as security patches) is even more of a
risk. This already complicated question is even further compounded in orga-
nizations that make use of dozens of upstream software components.
2.4 Code Clones
Roy et. al performed an analysis of code clones on more than fifteen open
source C and Java systems (Roy and Cordy, 2008). To perform the analysis,
they used the clone detection tool NICAD, which is effective for identical and
near-identical code clones. The results gathered were then validated manually
by visual inspection of the identified clone pairs. The researchers found that
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the clone detection tool was effective in identifying duplicated code in several
high profile C and Java open source software projects.
Jang et. al (Jang, Agrawal, and Brumley, 2012) presented a tool called ReDe-
Bug for finding unpatched code clones in operating system distributions such
as Debian GNU/Linux. ReDeBug is a tool designed to scale to the operating
system level and as such focuses on being fast and reducing the false detec-
tion rate of determining code clones. To evaluate the tool, the researchers ran
it across all packages in Debian Lenny and Squeeze, Ubuntu Maverick and
Oneiric, all SourceForge C/C++ projects, and the Linux kernel. It was able to
identify 15,546 unpatched vulnerabilities from performing this analysis. The
researchers were able to demonstrate the real world capabilities of ReDeBug
by confirming 145 bugs in Debian Squeeze packages.
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Chapter 3
Approach
In order to determine whether a vulnerability is present in a particular version
of software, we must be able to detect if the version exhibits the characteristics
of that vulnerability. We refer to this outcome as a vulnerability and version
pair.
The characteristics of a vulnerability are a result of the flaw in the software it-
self. That is, the logical error(s) that occurred when the software was written or
changed which gave birth to the vulnerability. The resolution of a vulnerability
is also introduced by a change to the software source.
Therefore, by searching for the correction to the error in the software source,
we can deduce whether that vulnerability is exhibited in that version of the
software. This correction comes in the form of a software patch, which forms
the fundamental element of the approach.
Note that this approach is useful only when developers do not specify the af-
fected versions of a software project. When the versions are called out, it is best
to rely upon the developer’s knowledge and expertise of the project which they
represent.
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3.1 Anatomy of a Patch
The approach centers around the use of a software patch. To fully understand
why this is useful and appropriate, it is crucial to understand what kind of
information a patch contains and how it is encoded.
A software patch is a special document that describes how to make one or more
changes to a codebase1. The GNU diff2 and patch3 utilities are examples
of programs used to create and apply patches, respectively. Source control
management systems such as Git use these tools to describe changes between
different revisions.
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of a software patch from the Apache HTTP
Server project.
The first section of the patch is known as the header. It contains information
such as source control metadata, authorship information, time stamps, and the
subject matter of the patch.
The body of the patch is composed of any number of diffs. Each diff describes
one or more changes to a single file within the source code tree. These changes
are known as hunks.
Each hunk contains information that describes how lines within a source file
are modified. A line can either be added or removed. An addition is denoted
by a line that is prefixed with a plus sign (+) whereas a removal is denoted by a
line that is prefixed with a minus sign (-). A hunk has no concept of a modified
line; rather a modification will be treated as a removal and an addition.
The information encoded by a patch is rich with information that can be used
to detect the resolution of a vulnerability within a software project. Relying
on a patch as the foundation of the approach means that the approach remains
1http://oss-watch.ac.uk/resources/softwarepatch
2https://www.gnu.org/software/diffutils/
3http://savannah.gnu.org/projects/patch/
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language independent and operates directly on the primary artifacts of the soft-
ware project.
3.2 Data Conditioning
To ensure we compute the most accurate and consistent results, a number of
steps are taken during or prior to execution of the detection process. These
steps focus on conditioning the input data to minimize the number of false
results.
1. Where possible, a patch that provides a resolution for the vulnerability is
extracted from the version control system of the project. A source control
specific patch (such as Figure 3.1) has additional metadata that assists
with resolving file histories across different versions. For the purposes of
this work, git format-patch -1 SHA was used to perform this step.
2. Source comments and other white space changes are pruned from the
patch. Comments have no effect on the operational aspect of the code and
therefore no implications with regards to the resolution of a vulnerabil-
ity and can be safely removed. Removing comments from the detection
process produces a more accurate ratio with respect to the code.
White space also has no bearing on the operation of the code. Moreover,
white space is prone to a high rate of churn within software projects,
which further reinforces the view that it should not be considered.
3. Non-language files, identified by file extension by means of GitHub’s
Linguist mapping4, and tests, identified by the case insensitive string
‘test’ or ‘tests’ in the file path, are ignored during processing and do not
contribute to the ratios as explained in Subsection 3.3.2.
4https://github.com/github/linguist/blob/master/lib/linguist/languages.yml
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4. For each file in the patch, an attempt is made to resolve the file’s path
between the time of the patch and the target version being tested. This
process requires access to a Git repository and relies heavily on the qual-
ity of information within the repository.
In many cases, obtaining a patch from a vulnerability can be a difficult process.
The quality of information varies on a case by case basis. Fortunately, a previ-
ous work focuses on linking a vulnerability to the change that resolves the de-
fect (H.-M. Chen et al., 2016). As long as the procedure in that research works
as intended, it can be used in conjunction with this work to build a pipeline
starting with a vulnerability identifier and ending in version sets.
3.3 Detection Process
In this section, the procedure that is used to operationalize the approach is
described.
Once a vulnerability is identified, a patch from the repository of the project in
question is extracted and prepared, it can be used in the detection procedure.
For each file in the patch, the changes are split up into two distinct lists: one
for additions and another for deletions. Next, the source of the file from the
version being test is read into a separate list.
The collection of source lines is iterated over twice; first as the list of additions
is iterated and again as the list of deletions is iterated. Through each iteration,
a line of source is compared against a change.
The comparison step consists of stripping all white space from both lines, split-
ting up each line into two sets of tokens, and checking the sets for equality.
The detected additions and deletions are then filtered down to ensure that
nothing is double counted. The filtering prevents lines that are simply moved
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and unmodified from being counted as parts of the results. As an example, the
following is an indicated change that would be ignored by the process:
- printf("");
+ printf("");
This procedure is repeated for all versions in a software project identified for
testing and collected into a mapping from version identifier to a result set.
3.3.1 One Line Changes
In the case of a patch that includes a one line change to a file, there is an addi-
tional component to the procedure. Rather than searching for only the change
to the file, it will also search for the context surrounding that change. Specifi-
cally, that means one line above and below the change in question, if applicable.
It is necessary to treat this scenario in a special manner because of the edge
case it presents. Searching for the presence or absence of one line does not pro-
vide enough context to sufficiently determine if the specific change is actually
exhibited in the file.
Because the one line has the potential to appear more than once in a file, it
would cause an unacceptable rise in the false positive rate. Forcing the change
alongside its context has the effect of considering only the area of the file that
is relevant.
The next section elaborates on how the final result is calculated and used to
determine a version’s vulnerability status.
3.3.2 Ratios
The raw values used to make a final determination of the status of a vulnerabil-
ity and version pair are two ratios: an additions ratio and deletions ratio. These
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values are calculated at the end of the procedure, as defined by Equation 3.1
and 3.2.
ra =

1
|Pa| ×
∑
f∈P
∑
a∈Pfa
(a ∈ Sf ), if |Pa| > 0
null, otherwise
(3.1)
rd =

1
|Pd| ×
∑
f∈P
∑
d∈Pfd
(d /∈ Sf ), if |Pd| > 0
null, otherwise
(3.2)
Where,
• ra and rd are the ratios of additions and deletions, respectively,
• Pa and Pd are the sets of all relevant additions and deletions in the patch,
respectively,
• P is the set of relevant files in the patch,
• Pfa is the set of relevant additions in the patch for f ,
• Pfd is the set of relevant deletions in the patch for f ,
• Sf is the set of source lines in f ,
• null indicates that the result will not be considered when determining a
final outcome
Both ra and rd have values that range from 0.0 to 1.0. An ra value of 1.0 means
that all additions are present in the source tree whereas a value of 0.0 means
that none of the additions are present. Similarly, an rd value of 1.0 means that
all deletions are not present in the source tree whereas a value of 0.0 means that
all are present.
In the case of a patch containing hunks that consist solely of either additions or
deletions, only the relevant ratio is considered.
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3.3.3 Ratio Thresholds
In order to determine the likelihood of a vulnerability being exhibited in a ver-
sion of software, the raw results generated by the methodology must be trans-
lated into more relevant findings.
Thus, there are three possible outcomes for each vulnerability and software
version pairing:
1. Vulnerable (V)
2. Not Vulnerable (NV)
3. Indeterminate (I)
Equation 3.3 describes the mapping from raw results to the possible outcomes:
R =

indeterminate, ¬(∃f ∈ P exists(f))
vulnerable, if ra < Ta or rd < Td
not vulnerable, otherwise
(3.3)
Where,
• R is the result or outcome,
• Ta and Td are the thresholds for additions and deletions, respectively,
• exists() is a function that determines if a file exists at a particular version
To develop a pair of thresholds for this work, the system was trained by manu-
ally inspecting the input patch and the source artifacts. The version of software
that included the patch is treated as the control version. That is, the version
that we are most certain includes the defect fix. This assertion is additionally
backup up by project metadata such as issue trackers that identify the version
in which the vulnerability is resolved. Ta and Td were set to 0.5 and 0.25, re-
spectively.
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FIGURE 3.1: Example of a software patch from the Apache
HTTP Server Project, created with git format-patch -1
From 2fe8ec85fa8ef1340a61e688f3bc43c799add78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "William A. Rowe Jr" <wrowe@apache.org>
Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2010 04:46:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] SECURITY: CVE-2010-0408 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_proxy_ajp: Respond with HTTP_BAD_REQUEST when the body is not sent after
request headers indicate a request body is incoming; this is not a case of
HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR.
Submitted by: Niku Toivola <niku.toivola sulake.com>
rpluem, jim, wrowe
git-svn-id: https://[...]/httpd/trunk@917875 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
---
modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
index 635ba32..0f5674c 100644
--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static int ap_proxy_ajp_request(apr_pool_t *p, request_rec *r,
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
"proxy: ap_get_brigade failed");
apr_brigade_destroy(input_brigade);
- return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
/* have something */
--
2.8.0
It is important to acknowledge that developing the thresholds in this manner
is not optimal and incorporates the bias of the author.
3.4 Data Sources
In this section, we describe the data sources used to generate results for the re-
search. There are two primary data sources that will be utilized either in part or
standalone. For the sake of this research, only open source projects were con-
sidered. However, with enough access to information for a proprietary project,
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the approach would work just as well.
3.4.1 National Vulnerability Database
The National Vulnerability Database (NVDB) is a public resource maintained
by the United States government that collects and makes available information
on disclosed vulnerabilities. This system provides historical feeds that can be
utilized for mining purposes.
The NVDB provides a rich data set that can be used to extract known vulner-
abilities for open source projects and useful metadata related to each vulnera-
bility.
3.4.2 Project Repository
For the approach to operate, it is critical to have complete access to the source
artifacts of the software project. The most effective way to get these artifacts
is by using the project repository itself. Additionally, repositories also typi-
cally contain the state of the source at each version, which is necessary for the
objectives of the approach.
3.4.3 Project Metadata
Open source projects are much more than the source that makes up the end
result. It is a collaboration of effort among individuals that requires constant
and clear communication.
To that end, there is a wealth of information stored in a project’s infrastructure,
such as mailing lists, issue trackers, and version control logs. Using this data
provides context with respect to a particular vulnerability; namely how it was
resolved and the time line of the defect.
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3.5 Implementation
A Python 3.5 application using the approach was developed to consistently
and efficiently generate results using the approach defined in Section 3.
The Python library GitPython5 was used to automate the manipulation of
repositories. Git tags are most commonly used to denote release points6. Thus,
tags were the primary mechanism used in evaluating each version of a software
project. However, because tags are used for more than just software releases,
the set of tags being used was manually verified to ensure it matched an ac-
tual release. Before checking out each tag for testing, git reset -hard and
git clean -df was executed in the repository to ensure there was no cross
contamination between versions.
The Python library whatthepatch7 was used to parse the contents of a patch.
Figure 3.4 is an example of how the patch in Figure 3.1 is parsed and repre-
sented. For each line in the patch, there is a tuple composed of three elements:
the original line number, the final line number, and the line contents. With this
in mind, there are three cases to consider in the parsed representation:
1. (1, None, ’...’): A line was removed
2. (None, 1, ’...’): A line was inserted
3. (1, 2, ’...’): The line remains unchanged
Along with access to the repository, the parsed representation of the patch be-
came the input for the detection process.
5https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython, Version 1.0.2
6https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Basics-Tagging
7https://github.com/cscorley/whatthepatch, Version 0.0.4
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3.6 File History Resolution
As noted in Subsection 3.2, one of the steps taken before the detection process
is the resolution of the paths of each file in the patch with respect to the target
version.
There are a number of scenarios that are possible, but not all can be handled
in a manner that leads to meaningful results. The ability to track a file through
history depends heavily on the project’s version control activities and practices.
Consider Figure 3.2. The figure represents a relatively simple history of a soft-
ware project. Each circle represents a change (or commit) to the tree, with
forward progression downward. The model being illustrated shows that the
project utilizes a single master branch off of which each version is tagged.
While there may be feature branching happening for development purposes,
everything is merged back into master before a release is tagged. Thus, for
the purposes of tracking, the history is linear and simple to follow. In this sce-
nario, the file’s path was changed after the patch was introduced. Catching
the change in path is straight forward as it simply a matter of analyzing each
change between the introduction of the patch and the tag 2.0.
Now consider Figure 3.3. In this case, the project is utilizing a more complex
model which includes release branches. For each major release (a major release
being the x in an x.y.z versioning scheme), a branch is created off of master
and used to sequentially tag the minor versions (typically starting at major.0).
With this model, it is much more difficult to track the history of a file. In this
specific scenario, a file path change and subsequent modification occurred af-
ter a branch was created for the 1.x series of releases. While not an extreme
situation by itself, the modification to the file was then backported8 to the 1.x
series by means of a cherry-pick9. Because the backporting process likely did
8Backporting is the process of retroactively applying newer changes to legacy versions of
software.
9https://git-scm.com/docs/git-cherry-pick
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FIGURE 3.2: A simple Git history involving a single master
branch
mast er  br anch
1. 0
2. 0
Fi l e pat h 
change
Fi l e 
modi f i cat i on
t ag
t ag
commi t
commi t
not include the change in the file path, it is necessary to backtrack to the ancestor
of both branches before moving forward to the 1.1 tag. Within our implemen-
tation, this is achieved by using git rev-list -ancestry-path.
These are only two scenarios of many. In some cases, it is impossible to find
out what has happened to a file between two points in history. For example,
at some point in between, a developer may have accidentally removed a file.
Realizing their mistake, they would have most likely added it back in at a later
point. By the time the tracking mechanism has reached the point of deletion,
however, the commit trail ends and the file would be marked deleted. It is
important to note that the history tracking method cannot make up for these
issues and will thus lead to indetermine outcomes as a fallback mechanism.
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FIGURE 3.3: A Git history involving master and release
branches
1. x br anch
cher r y- pi ck
backpor t
mast er  br anch
1. 0
2. 0
Fi l e 
modi f i cat i on
Fi l e pat h 
change
t ag
commi t
commi t
1. 1
2. x br anch
FIGURE 3.4: Example of a parsed patch
(257, 257, ’ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,’),
(258, 258, ’ "proxy: ap_get_brigade failed");’),
(259, 259, ’ apr_brigade_destroy(input_brigade);’),
(260, None, ’ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;’),
(None, 260, ’ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;’),
(261, 261, ’ }’),
(262, 262, ’’),
(263, 263, ’ /* have something */’)
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Results
In this section, the results of the approach are presented. The approach was ex-
ecuted across three separate Apache Software Foundation1 projects. The major
versions of each project were tested against a number of vulnerabilities found
from either the NVDB, the project’s issue tracker, or by mining the project’s
revision history. Because the evaluation described in Subsection 4.2 is an inten-
sive, time consuming process, we were forced to limit the number of versions
and vulnerabilities for each project.
Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 present the combined results from the approach and
the evaluation on the Apache HTTP Server Project2, Apache Hadoop3, and
Apache CloudStack4, respectively. These projects were chosen for their rich
project metadata, their relative importance in the software community, and the
set of historical vulnerabilities associated with each project.
Table 4.4 shows results for the versions that the project developers have deemed
to be not vulnerable. These versions were obtained from either the vulnerabil-
ity description page, the project’s respective issue tracking the defect, or the
project change log. In each instance, the version that contains the fix is explic-
itly identified by the project. For each of these versions, we also expect that the
1https://www.apache.org/
2https://httpd.apache.org/
3https://hadoop.apache.org/
4https://cloudstack.apache.org/
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TABLE 4.1: Combined result set and evaluation set for the
Apache HTTP Server Project
CVE-2004-0174a CVE-2006-3747b CVE-2007-1862c
Version Result Evaluation Result Evaluation Result Evaluation
1.2.0 I I I NV I NV
1.3.0 I I I NV I NV
2.0.1 V V V NV I NV
2.1.1 NV NV V V I NV
2.2.0 NV NV V V V NV
2.3.0 NV NV NV NV I NV
2.4.0 NV NV NV NV I NV
aResolved in versions 1.3.30 and 2.0.49
bResolved in version 2.2.3
cResolved in version 2.2.6
CVE-2014-3583a CVE-2014-8109a CVE-2015-3183b
Version Result Evaluation Result Evaluation Result Evaluation
1.2.0 I NV I NV I NV
1.3.0 I NV I NV I NV
2.0.1 I NV I NV V NV
2.1.1 I NV I NV V NV
2.2.0 I NV I NV V I
2.3.0 V NV I NV V I
2.4.0 V V V NV V I
aResolved in version 2.4.12
bResolved in version 2.4.16
approach will yield not vulnerable outcomes. With these results, we establish
baseline validity of the approach by showing that the outcomes of the approach
agree with what the project maintainers state about each vulnerability in rela-
tion to the version in which it was fixed.
The results of the approach will herein be referred to as the result set. The results
of the evaluation will be referred to as the evaluation set.
4.1 Understanding the Results
To make sense of the results, we must distinguish between the implications of
each outcome for each vulnerability and version pair.
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TABLE 4.2: Combined result set and evaluation set for Apache
Hadoop
YARN-1993a HADOOP-12964a CVE-2012-3376b
Version Results Evaluation Results Evaluation Results Evaluation
0.1.0 I NV I NV I NV
0.10.0 I NV I V I NV
0.11.0 I NV I V I NV
0.12.0 I NV I V I NV
0.13.0 I NV I V I NV
0.14.0 I NV I V I NV
0.15.0 I NV I V I NV
0.16.0 I NV I V I NV
0.17.0 I NV I V I NV
0.18.0 I NV I V I NV
0.19.0 I NV I V I NV
0.2.0 I NV I NV I NV
0.20.0 I NV I V I NV
0.21.0 I NV I V I NV
0.22.0 I NV I V I NV
0.23.0 I V I V I NV
0.3.0 I NV I V I NV
0.4.0 I NV I V I NV
0.5.0 I NV I V I NV
0.6.0 I NV I V I NV
0.7.0 I NV I V I NV
0.8.0 I NV I V I NV
0.9.0 I NV I V I NV
1.0.0 I NV I V I NV
1.1.0 I NV I V I NV
1.2.0 I NV I V I NV
2.2.0 V V I V NV NV
2.3.0 V V V V NV NV
2.4.0 V V V V NV NV
2.5.0 V V V V NV NV
2.6.0 V V V V NV NV
2.7.0 V V V V NV NV
aResolved in version 2.8.0; not released at the time of testing
bResolved in version 2.2.0
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TABLE 4.3: Combined result set and evaluation set for Apache
CloudStack
CVE-2015-3251a CVE-2015-3252a
Version Result Evaluation Result Evaluation
2.1.3 I I I I
2.2.0 I I I I
3.0.1 I I I I
4.0.2 I I V I
4.1.0 V I V I
4.2.0 V I V I
4.3.0 V V V V
4.4.0 V V V V
4.5.1 V V V V
4.6.0 NV NV NV NV
4.7.0 NV NV NV NV
4.8.0 NV NV NV NV
aResolved in version 4.5.2
TABLE 4.4: Results that establish baseline validity by showing
not vulnerable for resolved versions
Vulnerability Version Fixed Result
Apache HTTP Server
CVE-2004-0174 1.3.30, 2.0.49 NV
CVE-2006-3747 2.2.3 NV
CVE-2007-1862 2.2.6 NV
CVE-2014-3583 2.4.12 NV
CVE-2014-8109 2.4.12 NV
CVE-2015-3183 2.4.16 NV
Apache Hadoop
YARN-1993 2.8.0a N/A
HADOOP-12964 2.8.0a N/A
CVE-2012-3376 2.2.0 NV
Apache CloudStack
CVE-2015-3251 4.5.2 NV
CVE-2015-3252 4.5.2 NV
aNot available at time of testing
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A vulnerable outcome implies that the version of software exhibits the charac-
teristics of the vulnerability being tested. The software itself may or may not
be exploitable, depending on the circumstance.
A not vulnerable outcome implies that the version of software does not exhibit
the characteristics of the vulnerability being tested.
An indeterminate outcome means that there was insufficient data available to
make a confident determination. In the result set, a vulnerability and version
pair is marked as indeterminate when none of the files that comprise the body
of the patch are present in the source code tree of that version. In the evaluation
set, a vulnerability and version pair is marked indeterminate at the discretion
of the researcher along with a rationale.
4.2 Evaluation
In order to effectively establish the validity of the approach, a separate and un-
biased analysis of the same data set was performed by an independent security
researcher.
The security researcher was instructed to perform a security review of all vul-
nerabilities across all listed versions of each project. The researcher was per-
mitted to use any methodology (static analysis, runtime exploitation, manual
investigation, etc.) of their choosing to determinate vulnerability status. Addi-
tional, they were instructed to use the same result types (vulnerable, not vulnerable,
and indeterminate). However, the formal definition of indeterminate was not
established at the time of the evaluation.
The author of this work had no access to the results of the analysis or the inde-
pendent researcher before results from the approach had been generated.
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Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 present the results from the independent evaluation
alongside the results from the approach.
Furthermore, it was important to establish that the approach indicated not vulnerable
for the versions that the developer indicated as such. The result tables note the
versions for which each vulnerability was considered resolved.
4.3 Example
CVE-2004-0174 is an identifier for a security vulnerability within the Apache
HTTP Server. The essence of the vulnerability is that the server’s connection
handler, server/listen.c, does not handle short-lived connections in an
appropriate manner which may lead to a race condition and denial of service
attacks. This issue was resolved in version 1.3.30 of the 1.3.x series and version
2.0.49 of the 2.0.x series.
Table 4.1 shows that for version 2.0.1 of the Apache HTTP Server, both the re-
sult set and evaluation set indicate that this version was subject to the vulner-
ability. However, versions 1.2.0 and 1.3.0 were both marked as indeterminate
by the result set and evaluation set. The security researcher that produced the
evaluation set gave the following rationale: “Connection handler is in http_main.c.”
The result set indicates indeterminate because the relevant source files were
not present at these points in the project’s history. From version 2.1.1 and for-
ward, both the result set and evaluation set indicate that the software is no
longer subject to the vulnerability.
CVE-2015-3251 is an identifier for a security vulnerability within Apache Cloud-
Stack. The issue allows remotely authenticated administrators to obtain pass-
word information for the root accounts of virtual machines under a CloudStack
deployment’s control. This issue was resolved in version 4.5.2.
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Table 4.3 shows that versions 4.1.0 and 4.2.0 were indicated to be vulnerable by
the result set. However, the evaluation set indicates that these versions were
considered to be indeterminate. The rationale provided for this conclusion
was that these versions have a different code structure as compared with the
vulnerable versions of the software (versions 4.3.0, 4.4.0, and 4.5.1).
4.4 Discussion
The nature of the three types of outcomes means we cannot easily use binary
classification techniques to assess the performance of the approach and result
set.
Instead, the performance of the results set can be assessed by analyzing its level
of agreement with the evaluation set. Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 contain break-
downs of each outcome type from the result set as the ratios of their counter-
parts in the evaluation set. For example, for all of the vulnerable CloudStack
results in Table 4.6, 54.54% of them were also found to be vulnerable in the
evaluation set, 0% of them were found to be not vulnerable, and 45.45% of
them were found to be indeterminate.
Interpreting the performance in this manner reveals that the approach as mea-
sured by the evaluation set is extremely conservative in marking a vulnerabil-
ity and version pair as not vulnerable. For vulnerable outcomes in the result
set, only Hadoop had equivalent outcomes in the evaluation set. However, for
all not vulnerable outcomes in the result set, the evaluation set also had equiv-
alent not vulnerable outcomes.
When indeterminate vulnerability and version pairs are broken down into ra-
tios of their corresponding pairs, we see (with the exception of CloudStack)
that the majority of outcomes in the evaluation set are not vulnerable. While
the number of indetermine outcomes may be alarming at first, the comparison
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TABLE 4.5: Performance without indeterminate outcomes
Accuracy Precision Recall F-measure
86.6% 77.7% 100% 87.5%
TABLE 4.6: Breakdown of vulnerable vulnerability and version
pair outcomes in the result set for each project as ratios of their
respective counterparts in the evaluation set
Result Set
HTTP Hadoop CloudStack
Evaluation Set
Vulnerable 30.76% 100% 54.54%
Not Vulnerable 46.15% 0% 0%
Indeterminate 23.07% 0% 45.45%
to the evaluation shows that we can lend further credibility to the approach
and its conservative nature.
Recall that the only context the approach has is a single patch containing the
changes that introduce a fix for the vulnerability. The researcher, meanwhile,
is able to use whatever resources they deem necessary to determine the vul-
nerability status. In many of the cases, even the researcher was not able to
confidently mark an outcome, as the CloudStack evaluation set shows. When
considering the context and the nature of the results, it is appropriate and ex-
pected that the indeterminate outcome appears as frequently as it has in the
result set.
If we consider the results without indeterminate outcomes, as defined by:
{ x 6= indeterminate | x ∈ (Results ∩ Evaluation) }
then a binary classification of the results can be performed. In this context,
a not vulnerable result would be considered negative and a vulnerable result
would be considered positive. The performance of the approach after filtering
the results on this criteria is shown in Table 4.5. The precision is calculated to
be 77.7% and the recall is calculated to be 100% for an F-measure of 87.5%.
The approach favors erring on the side of caution by indicating a pair is either
vulnerable or indeterminate. Put another way, when the approach must bias
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TABLE 4.7: Breakdown of not vulnerable vulnerability and ver-
sion pair outcomes in the result set for each project as ratios of
their respective counterparts in the evaluation set
Result Set
HTTP Hadoop CloudStack
Evaluation Set
Vulnerable 0% 0% 0%
Not Vulnerable 100% 100% 100%
Indeterminate 0% 0% 0%
TABLE 4.8: Breakdown of indeterminate vulnerability and ver-
sion pair outcomes in the result set for each project as ratios of
their respective counterparts in the evaluation set
Result Set
HTTP Hadoop CloudStack
Evaluation Set
Vulnerable 0% 32.91% 0%
Not Vulnerable 91.30% 67.08% 0%
Indeterminate 8.69% 0% 100%
itself towards either false negatives or false positives, favoring false positives
is decidedly superior. When framed in the context of security, this is fitting and
advantageous. Security is a critical and particularly detail oriented activity.
Misplaced faith in tooling or the smallest, overlooked details have the potential
to lead to disastrous results.
4.5 Threats to Validity
There are several threats that pose a risk to the approach and corresponding
implementation.
The author used their own experiences and expertise to define the thresholds
that map raw values to an outcome. Therefore, personal bias is inherent in
these thresholds and results. Including additional experts as well as expand-
ing the quantity and diversity of projects tested would correct this bias. The 5.2
section touches on this by suggesting the use of machine learning as a mecha-
nism to resolve this issue.
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As Bird et. al note, version control metadata can provide a rich source of infor-
mation but the quality varies widely from project to project (Bird et al., 2009).
The approach relies heavily on high quality version control metadata being
available. Specifically, insufficient or poor file history may cause invalid or in-
determinate results. Refactoring or restructuring efforts within a project could
lead to similar outcomes. Further efforts to more intelligently handle version
control efforts may mitigate this risk.
Finally, we are relying upon the security researcher’s expertise to provide high
quality, reliable data against which to test the result set for validity. While this
is not an unusual approach in and of itself, there is a problem with calling
a version of software not vulnerable. Identifying a version as vulnerable (or
even indeterminate) is acceptable because it rests upon a provable premise.
Not vulnerable, however, is not as concrete. It is the difference between prov-
ing that something exists and proving that something does not exist. The for-
mer is concrete in nature while the latter is not. To account for this threat, we
have included the rationale for each outcome in the evaluation set. These ra-
tionales can be found in Appendix A of this work.
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Conclusions
5.1 Applications
The primary contribution of this work is to identify sets of versions of software
that exhibit a particular vulnerability. To that end, an end to end system could
be integrated as part of a development work flow that utilizes this approach.
Such a system would have two uses: 1. warn developers of changes in areas
that have been affected by past vulnerabilities and the likelihood that they may
be re-introducing the vulnerability and 2. notify developers of potentially vul-
nerable dependencies within their software. A notification system would rely
upon the ability to accurately identify the versions of dependencies included
within a project.
The second noted use would need to be combined with work related to the
identification of dependencies within software systems.
5.2 Future Work
In a future work, the approach can be expanded to address some of the issues
identified in Section 4.5. The implementation can be improved to better handle
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tracking files across history and through code changes to more accurately re-
flect the state of a project with respect to a vulnerability. Additionally, machine
learning techniques as well as a larger and more diverse set of projects can be
applied to refine the approach for accuracy and applicability.
The manual parts of the approach can be made automatic to better integrate
the system into a development work flow. A more sophisticated tool can be
devised that uses this research as a foundation in order to fully integrate the
approach into a development work flow. In combination with other tools, such
a system will be able to identify changes that affect previously vulnerable areas
and alert developers of potentially vulnerable dependencies.
5.3 Conclusion
The objectives of this research were twofold: 1. to propose a general algorith-
mic approach to establishing the presence of a known vulnerability in a soft-
ware project and 2. using this approach, generate a set of versions of a soft-
ware project indicating which exhibit a specific vulnerability. In devising an
approach, a software patch that corrects a defect was established as the ground
truth.
Three Apache Foundation projects were chosen to establish the approach as an
effective mechanism. A set of vulnerabilities were chosen from each project’s
respective history. A total of eleven vulnerabilities were tested across all projects.
An independent security researcher performed a separate analysis on the same
set of projects and vulnerabilities in order to evaluate the results of the ap-
proach.
Comparing the results of the approach to the results of the independent evalua-
tion shows that the approach has merit. An analysis of the comparison reveals
the conservative nature of the approach: that the approach favors marking a
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software version as vulnerable over non vulnerable. We argue such a conser-
vative approach is actually beneficial in this area of research. It is more appro-
priate to be cautious in deciding on the lack of a vulnerability as opposed to
the alternative.
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Appendix A
Evaluation Rationales
TABLE A.1: Evaluation set outcome rationales for the Apache
HTTP Server Project
Version CVE-2004-0174
1.2.0 Connection handler is in http_main.c
1.3.0 Connection handler is in http_main.c
2.0.1 Does not handle multiple connections in listen.c
2.1.1 Patched
2.2.0 Patched
2.3.0 Patched
2.4.0 Patched
Version CVE-2006-3747
1.2.0 Problematic condition statement does not exist
1.3.0 Problematic condition statement does not exist
2.0.1 Problematic condition statement does not exist
2.1.1 Condition statement has an off-by-one error
2.2.0 Condition statement has an off-by-one error
2.3.0 Condition statement is implemented correctly
2.4.0 Condition statement is implemented correctly
Version CVE-2007-1862
1.2.0 mod_mem_cache is not available
1.3.0 mod_mem_cache is not available
2.0.1 mod_mem_cache is not available
2.1.1 Does not use apr_table_copy to store/recall headers
2.2.0 Does not use apr_table_copy to store/recall headers
2.3.0 Code structure changed, different mechanism is used
2.4.0 Code structure changed, different mechanism is used
Appendix A. Evaluation Rationales 38
Version CVE-2014-3583
1.2.0 mod_proxy_fcgi is not available
1.3.0 mod_proxy_fcgi is not available
2.0.1 mod_proxy_fcgi is not available
2.1.1 mod_proxy_fcgi is not available
2.2.0 mod_proxy_fcgi is not available
2.3.0 Buffers passed to handle_headers() are ensured to be
properly NULL terminated
2.4.0 Cause of the vulnerability is present in this version
Version CVE-2014-8109
1.2.0 mod_lua is not available
1.3.0 mod_lua is not available
2.0.1 mod_lua is not available
2.1.1 mod_lua is not available
2.2.0 mod_lua is not available
2.3.0 mod_lua is not available
2.4.0 LuaAuthzProvider prohibits users from supplying their
own scripts to perform authorization
Version CVE-2015-3183
1.2.0 http_filters is not available
1.3.0 http_filters is not available
2.0.1 http_filters is not available
2.1.1 http_filters is not available
2.2.0 Different code structure
2.3.0 Different code structure
2.4.0 Different code structure
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TABLE A.2: Evaluation set outcome rationales for Apache
Hadoop
Version YARN-1993
0.1.0 YARN is not implemented
0.10.0 YARN is not implemented
0.11.0 YARN is not implemented
0.12.0 YARN is not implemented
0.13.0 YARN is not implemented
0.14.0 YARN is not implemented
0.15.0 YARN is not implemented
0.16.0 YARN is not implemented
0.17.0 YARN is not implemented
0.18.0 YARN is not implemented
0.19.0 YARN is not implemented
0.2.0 YARN is not implemented
0.20.0 YARN is not implemented
0.21.0 YARN is not implemented
0.22.0 YARN is not implemented
0.23.0 In TextView.java, echo() does not properly sanitize
HTML attribute name
0.3.0 YARN is not implemented
0.4.0 YARN is not implemented
0.5.0 YARN is not implemented
0.6.0 YARN is not implemented
0.7.0 YARN is not implemented
0.8.0 YARN is not implemented
0.9.0 YARN is not implemented
1.0.0 YARN is not implemented
1.1.0 YARN is not implemented
1.2.0 YARN is not implemented
2.2.0 In TextView.java, echo() does not properly sanitize
HTML attribute name
2.3.0 In TextView.java, echo() does not properly sanitize
HTML attribute name
2.4.0 In TextView.java, echo() does not properly sanitize
HTML attribute name
2.5.0 In TextView.java, echo() does not properly sanitize
HTML attribute name
2.6.0 In TextView.java, echo() does not properly sanitize
HTML attribute name
2.7.0 In TextView.java, echo() does not properly sanitize
HTML attribute name
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Version HADOOP-12964
0.1.0 HTTP was not used extensively
0.10.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.11.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.12.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.13.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.14.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.15.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.16.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.17.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.18.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.19.0 HttpServer.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.2.0 HTTP was not used extensively
0.20.0 HttpServer.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.21.0 HttpServer.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.22.0 HttpServer.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.23.0 HttpServer.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.3.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.4.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.5.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.6.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.7.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.8.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
0.9.0 StatusHttpServer does not set an X-Frame-Options header
1.0.0 HttpServer.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
1.1.0 HttpServer.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
1.2.0 HttpServer.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
2.2.0 HttpServer.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
2.3.0 HttpServer2.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
2.4.0 HttpServer2.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
2.5.0 HttpServer2.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
2.6.0 HttpServer2.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
2.7.0 HttpServer2.java does not set an X-Frame-Options header
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Version CVE-2012-3376
0.1.0 Does not contain federation features
0.10.0 Does not contain federation features
0.11.0 Does not contain federation features
0.12.0 Does not contain federation features
0.13.0 Does not contain federation features
0.14.0 Does not contain federation features
0.15.0 Does not contain federation features
0.16.0 Does not contain federation features
0.17.0 Does not contain federation features
0.18.0 Does not contain federation features
0.19.0 Does not contain federation features
0.2.0 Does not contain federation features
0.20.0 Does not contain federation features
0.21.0 Does not contain federation features
0.22.0 Does not contain federation features
0.23.0 Does not contain federation features
0.3.0 Does not contain federation features
0.4.0 Does not contain federation features
0.5.0 Does not contain federation features
0.6.0 Does not contain federation features
0.7.0 Does not contain federation features
0.8.0 Does not contain federation features
0.9.0 Does not contain federation features
1.0.0 Does not contain federation features
1.1.0 Does not contain federation features
1.2.0 Does not contain federation features
2.2.0 Patched
2.3.0 Patched
2.4.0 Patched
2.5.0 Patched
2.6.0 Patched
2.7.0 Patched
Appendix A. Evaluation Rationales 42
TABLE A.3: Evaluation set outcome rationales for Apache
CloudStack
Version CVE-2015-3251
2.1.3 Different code structure
2.2.0 Different code structure
3.0.1 Different code structure
4.0.2 Different code structure
4.1.0 Different code structure
4.2.0 Different code structure
4.3.0 In LibvirtComputingResource.java, when re-
booting virtual machines, sensitive information is
exposed since certain properties do not have the
VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE flag.
4.4.0 In LibvirtComputingResource.java, when re-
booting virtual machines, sensitive information is
exposed since certain properties do not have the
VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE flag.
4.5.1 In LibvirtComputingResource.java, when re-
booting virtual machines, sensitive information is
exposed since certain properties do not have the
VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE flag.
4.6.0 Patched
4.7.0 Patched
4.8.0 Patched
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Version CVE-2015-3252
2.1.3 Different code structure
2.2.0 Different code structure
3.0.1 Different code structure
4.0.2 Different code structure
4.1.0 Different code structure
4.2.0 Different code structure
4.3.0 In LibvirtComputingResource.java, when re-
booting virtual machines, sensitive information is
exposed since certain properties do not have the
VIR_DOMAIN_XML_MIGRATABLE flag.
4.4.0 In LibvirtComputingResource.java, when re-
booting virtual machines, sensitive information is
exposed since certain properties do not have the
VIR_DOMAIN_XML_MIGRATABLE flag.
4.5.1 In LibvirtComputingResource.java, when re-
booting virtual machines, sensitive information is
exposed since certain properties do not have the
VIR_DOMAIN_XML_MIGRATABLE flag.
4.6.0 Patched
4.7.0 Patched
4.8.0 Patched
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